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In 1900 only 6% of unwed teenage females engaged in premarital sex. Now, three quarters do. The sexual revolution
isstudiedhereusinganequilibriummatchingmodel,wherethecostsofpremaritalsexfallovertimeduetotechnological
improvement in contraceptives. Individuals differ in their desire for sex. Given this, people tend to circulate in social
groups where prospective partners share their views on premarital sex. To the extent that society’s customs and mores
reﬂecttheaggregationofdecentralizeddecisionmakingbyitsmembers,shiftsintheeconomicenvironmentmayinduce
changes in what is perceived as culture.
Why is there so much social change today, and why was there so little in ancient times? The most
probable answer, the result of quite extensive study, is mechanical invention and scientiﬁc discovery.
There is no doubt that useful inventions and researches cause social changes. Steam and steel were
major forces in developing our extensive urban life. Gunpowder inﬂuenced the decline of feudalism.
Thediscoveryofseed-plantingdestroyedthehuntingculturesandbroughtaradicallynewformofsocial
life. The automobile is helping to create the metropolitan community. Small inventions, likewise, have
far-reaching effects. The coin-in-the-slot device changes the range and nature of salesmanship, radically
affects different businesses, and creates unemployment. The effects of the invention of contraceptives
on population and social institutions is so vast as to defy human estimation. It is obvious, then, that
social changes are caused by inventions.
— William F. Ogburn (1936, pp. 1–2)
1. INTRODUCTION
There may be no better illustration of social change than the sexual revolution that occurred
during the 20th century. In 1900 almost no unmarried teenage girl engaged in premarital sex,
only a paltry 6%—see Figure 1(left-hand panel). By 2002 a large majority (roughly 75%) had
experienced this. What caused this: the contraception revolution. (Sources for the U.S. data
displayed in all ﬁgures and tables are detailed in the Appendix, Section B) Both the technology
for contraception and education about its practice changed dramatically over the course of the
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FIGURE 1
(I) PERCENTAGE OF 19-YEAR-OLD FEMALES WITH PREMARITAL SEXUAL EXPERIENCE (LEFT-HAND PANEL); (II) OUT-OF-WEDLOCK
BIRTHS, PERCENTAGE (LEFT-HAND PANEL); (III) NUMBER OF PARTNERS BY AGE 20 FOR WOMEN ENGAGING IN PREMARITAL SEX,
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION BY BIRTH COHORT (RIGHT-HAND PANEL)
last century. Another reﬂection of the change in sexual mores is the rise in the number of sexual
partners that unmarried females have. For women born between 1933 and 1942, the majority of
those who engaged in premarital sex had only one partner by age 20, presumably their future
husband—see Figure 1(right-hand panel). By the 1963–72 cohort, the majority of these women
had at least two partners. Notwithstanding the great improvement in contraception technology
and education, the number of out-of-wedlock births rose from 3% in 1920 to 33% in 1999—
Figure 1(left-hand panel). Despite great public concern about teenage sexual behavior in recent
years,therehasnotbeenanyattempttobuildformalmodelsofit.Thecurrentworkwillattempt
to ﬁll this void.
1.1. The Analysis. The rise in premarital sex will be analyzed within the context of an
equilibrium unisex matching model. The model has three salient features. First, when engaging
in premarital sex individuals deliberate the costs and beneﬁts from this risky activity. The avail-
ability of contraceptives and abortion will lower the costs of premarital sex. Second, individuals
differ in their tastes for sex. A person desires a mate who is similarly inclined so that they can
enjoythesamelifestyle.Thisleadstoabilateralsearchstructure.Third,giventhatpeopledesire
to ﬁnd partners that share their views on sex, they will pick to circulate within social groups
who subscribe to their beliefs. This is the most efﬁcient way to ﬁnd a suitable partner. The mem-
bership of social groups is therefore endogenous. Shifts in the sizes of the groups reﬂect social
change.
It is established theoretically that in the developed matching model’s steady state the popula-
tionsortsveryneatlyintotwosocialgroups.2 Thosewhowantanabstinentrelationshipcirculate
exclusively among people who share the same ideal, whereas those who prefer a promiscuous
2 Thisnotionisnotwithoutsomeprecedence.Forexample,BurdettandColes(1997)illustratewithinthecontextofa
maritalsearchmodelhowpeoplemaywedexclusivelywithintheirownsocialclass(whichissomerangeoftypes).Search
is not directed within one’s own social class, however. People look over the entire marriage market. An equilibrium
may obtain where individuals choose to reject all potential mates below their own social class.SOCIAL CHANGE 895
one associate with others who desire the same thing. This allows for efﬁcient search, which
would not transpire in the steady state of a standard search model. It does not have to happen
outside of a steady state. It is also shown theoretically that the model is likely to display rapid
transitional dynamics. This is desirable since sexual practice appears to have responded quite
quickly to the availability of new and improved contraception. The model is solved numerically
inordertoassessitsabilitytoexplaintheriseinpremaritalsexoverthe20thcentury.Akeystep
in the simulation is the construction of a time series reﬂecting the cost of sex. This series is based
upon the observed effectiveness and use of various types of contraception. The framework can
replicate well the rapid rise in premarital sex that the last 100 years witnessed. In particular, it is
found that (i) the reduction in the risk of pregnancy due to the availability of new and improved
contraception encouraged the rise of premarital sex and (ii) increased accessibility to abortion
promoted premarital sex. The model also does a reasonable job mimicking the rise in teenage
pregnancies. That it can do so is not a foregone conclusion. On the one hand, an increase in
the efﬁcacy of contraception implies that there should be fewer pregnancies. On the other, it
promotes more premarital sex. The end result depends on how these two factors interact.
The search framework developed here has implications that would be harder to examine
using other paradigms. First, the model is able to match both the fraction of teenagers having
sex in a given period as well as the proportion who have had sex by age 19. Likewise, the
model can give predictions on the fraction of teenagers becoming pregnant each period and the
proportion who become pregnant by age 19. These two measures would be hard to disentangle
inastaticmodel.Yet,theymighthavedifferentrelevanciesforpublicpolicies.Theformercould
be indicative of the aggregate per-period costs of premarital sex, the latter a measure of the risk
of premarital sex for a teenage girl. Second, the model can match the median duration of an
adolescent relationship and the average number of partners for sexually active teenagers. In
the data there is a huge dispersion across the number of sexual partners. The current prototype
has difﬁculty matching this latter fact, but future versions might be able to do so. Modeling the
average number of, and the dispersion in, sexual partners is likely to be important for shedding
light on the spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS/HIV. The adjustment of
individual behavior to the risk of the infection, to prophylaxes that change the risk, and to the
likelihoodofhavingthediseasebaseduponpastbehaviorcouldbeimportantforunderstanding
its transmission. Individuals could search for partners within certain risk pools, depending on
their preferences for different types of sex. Future versions of the framework could be used to
study this, something that would be difﬁcult to do in a static framework.
The investigation is conducted within the context of a unisex framework. The model is used
to address some stylized facts concerning female sexual behavior, such as the aforementioned
rise in out-of-wedlock births. The costs of engaging in premarital sex are obviously different for
males and females. An out-of-wedlock birth may severely affect a young girl’s educational and
jobprospectsaswellasheropportunitiesforﬁndingafuturemate.Therefore,girlsarelikelytobe
lesspromiscuousthanboys.Additionally,promiscuitymaydifferbyfamilybackground,because
girlsfrompoorerfamiliesmayfeelthattheyhavelesstolosefromanout-of-wedlockbirth.These
are important considerations, but incorporating them would introduce extra complications.3
The unisex abstraction conducted here really does little violence to the questions poised by
Figure 1.
Thereisempiricalworkthatconnectsdifferencesinculturetodifferencesineconomicdecision
making. Guiliano (2007) ﬁnds that, in the wake of the sexual revolution, young Americans
whose parents came from Southern Europe are now more likely to live at home compared
with those whose parents come from Northern Europe. She argues that family ties are stronger
for Southerners and that a liberalization of sexual attitudes allowed young adults to remain in
their parents’ home while enjoying an active sexual life. Similarly, Fern´ andez and Fogli (2009)
3 AmodelwiththesefeaturesispresentedinFern´ andez-Villaverdeetal.(2009).TheiranalysisisinthespiritofBecker
and Mulligan (1997) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008). In particular, a child’s preferences are affected by parental and
institutional investments. The focus of the Fern´ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009) is on the socialization of children by
their parents and institutions such as the church. They illustrate how the inculcation of sexual mores is affected by the
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examine fertility and labor-force participation rates for American born women whose parents
wereimmigrants.Theyarguethatancestraldifferencesinfamilyculturehaveexplanatorypower
forworkandfertilitybehaviortoday.Thecurrentarticleshouldnotbereadassayingthatculture
does not matter, but rather that some part of it may be endogenous.4
2. ENVIRONMENT
Suppose that there are two social classes in society, one whose members are abstinent, the
other whose members are promiscuous. Members in a social class circulate among themselves.
Each class is a separate world, so to speak, but the members of a particular class are free to
switch to the other class at any time. Social change will be measured by the shift in membership
between the two classes.
Each member of society is indexed by the variable j ∈ J ={j1, j2,···, jn}, which represents
his or her joy from sex. The value of j is known by an individual. Let j be distributed across
individuals according to the density function J(ji) = φi, with 0 <φ i < 1,
 n
i=1 φi = 1, and j1 <
j2 < ···< jn.Supposethattimeﬂowsdiscretely.Atthebeginningofeachperiod,anunattached
member in a class will match with another single individual in the same class with probability
µ. The partner’s type will be randomly determined in accordance with the type distribution
prevailing at that time within the class. This couple must then make two intertwined decisions:
whetherornottostaytogetherfortheperiodandwhichsocialclasstojoin.Iftheychoosenotto
stay together, then they must wait until the next period for another opportunity to match. With
probability1 − µanunattachedpersonfailstomatchwithanothersingleone.Theseindividuals
just decide upon which social class to join. This will inﬂuence the type of mate that they might
draw next period.
Similarly, at the beginning of each period, matches in each class from the previous period
break up with probability δ. Couples in the surviving matches must also make two inextricably
linked decisions, to wit, whether or not to remain together and which social class to join. If they
choose to break up then they must wait until the next period for another matching opportunity.
Like single agents who fail to match, couples whose relationships break up exogenously just
decide upon which social class to join.
Let a matched person in the abstinence class enjoy a level of momentary utility level of u,
and a single person realize a momentary utility level of w, with u >w . A matched person in the
promiscuity class realizes a momentary utility level of u + j − c, where j is the joy from sex and
c is the expected cost of it, say, due to an out-of-wedlock birth or a sexually transmitted disease.
Note that c cannot represent a stigma effect since this is really an attitude. Change in attitudes
and behavior are what is being modeled here. An unmatched person in this class attains a utility
of w. Individuals discount next period’s utility by the factor β. Assume that u,w,j, and c are
speciﬁed in a way that guarantees that expected lifetime utility is always positive. Assume that
u,w,j, and c are ﬁnite, which ensures that expected lifetime utility is bounded.
In order to complete the setup, some structure will be placed on the population. First, the
size of the population will be normalized to one. Second, each period a fraction 1 − ζ of the
population will move on to another phase of life, which will be interpreted as adulthood. This
4 It may take some time for culture to respond to a new technological environment. Sometimes the change is sudden,
other times it may be more gradual or smooth. For example, social behavior may be governed by norms—see the
classic paper by Cole et al. (1992). Individuals who transgress the norm may be collectively outcast or shunned by
other members of society. Given this fact, most individuals may rationally choose to subscribe to the social norm.
As the economic environment changes, it may become increasingly impossible to sustain such a norm. Eventually, it
collapses. Or, the process might be a gradual or smooth change in socialization practices in response to shifts in the
environment, as is modeled in Fern´ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009). Alternatively, Fern´ andez et al. (2004) assume that
childrens’preferencesareafunctionoftheirparents’lifestyles(inahabit-formationway),whichmaychangeslowlyover
time. Another example of culture adapting to technological progress is contained in Doepke and Tertilt (2009). They
arguethatwomen’sliberationinthe19thcenturywastheresultofrisingreturnstohumancapitalformationforfemales.
In extending rights to women, men faced a trade-off between losing power with their own wives but emancipating other
men’s wives, such as their own daughters. This trade-off resolves in favor of extending rights for all women when the
returns to human capital are high enough.SOCIAL CHANGE 897
latter phase of life will be taken to be a facsimile of their current life, but in a different location.
These people are selected at random and are replenished by an equal ﬂow of young unmatched
individuals. Let couples relocate together. So, assume that each single and each couple face a
relocation probability of 1 − ζ.5
The idea is that over time the cost of premarital sex, c, declines due to technological progress
in contraception and improvements in birth control education. As a consequence, people move
out of the abstinence class, A, into the promiscuity class, P. As will be seen, there may also
be some secondary movement from P to A. For example, some people may choose to live a
promiscuous lifestyle rather than lose their partner. When one of these matches breaks up, one
individual may move back to A.
3. DECISION PROBLEMS
Let A m(j, ˜ j) denote the expected lifetime utility for an individual of type j who is currently
in an abstinent match with a partner of type ˜ j. An individual does not experience any joy
from sex while abstinent. But, s/he could in the future. Thus, A m should still be a function of
j. Also, an individual’s joy from sex does not depend directly upon his partner’s type, ˜ j. Still,
he cares indirectly about ˜ j because this will delimit his future matching possibilities, as will be
seen. Next, deﬁne A s(j) to be the expected lifetime utility for a single (or unmatched) agent in
class A. Turn now to the promiscuous class. Here Pm(j, ˜ j) will represent the expected lifetime
utility for individual j who is currently in a promiscuous match with ˜ j, and Ps(j) will proxy for
the expected lifetime utility for a single agent in class P. Finally, suppose that j and ˜ j meet.
What will be the outcome of this meeting? Let am(j, ˜ j) be the equilibrium probability that an
abstinent relationship will occur, pm(j, ˜ j) denote the odds that a promiscuous one transpires,
and 1 − am(j, ˜ j) − pm(j, ˜ j) give the chance that no match will ensue.
As will be seen, these equilibrium matching probabilities split the space of potential pairwise
matches, J × J, into four types of zones, viz., one where both parties desire an abstinent rela-
tionship so that am(j, ˜ j) = 1; another where both want a sexual one implying that pm(j, ˜ j) = 1;
a mixing region where one party prefers an abstinent relationship, the other side a sexual one,
but both prefer some sort of relationship to none, so that 0 < am(j, ˜ j),pm(j, ˜ j) < 1; and a zone
where no relationship of any sort is possible and am(j, ˜ j) = pm(j, ˜ j) = 0. An example of this is
shown in Figure 2, which is detailed in Section 9.1 in this ﬁgure both parties prefer some sort of
relationship to none at all.
3.1. The Abstinence Class, A. Suppose person j is matched with ˜ j in A. The recursion
deﬁning the value of this match for j, or the function A m(j, ˜ j), is given by
A m(j, ˜ j) = u + β(1 − δ)[am (j, ˜ j)A m (j, ˜ j) + pm (j, ˜ j)Pm (j, ˜ j)]
+ β{δ + (1 − δ)[1 − am (j, ˜ j) − pm (j, ˜ j)]}max{A s (j), Ps (j)},
(1)
where in standard fashion a prime attached to a variable or function denotes its value next
period. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the momentary utility realized today from an
abstinent match, u. The rest of the terms give the discounted value of the lifetime utility that j
5 Making an adult’s world look like a teenager’s one requires some additional assumptions. First, suppose that adults
survive with probability 2ζ − 1. Second, assume that some new unmatched adults ﬂow in from another source at rate
1 − ζ; i.e., there is a ﬂow in of unmatched adults who somehow missed teenage life. These two assumptions ensure that
an adult’s world will have the same type distributions as the teenager’s one. Third, when adults die, assume that they
realize a utility level of zero from then. Fourth, set the discount factor for an adult, ˜ β, so that ˜ β = β/[2ζ − 1]. The last
two assumptions guarantee that the adult’s programming problem will be a copy of the teenager’s one, even though the
former faces death. These assumptions are made to ensure logical consistency, not realism. Alternatively, one could just
simply assume that in adult life one obtains an expected lifetime utility of V, a constant. Since a teen shifts into adult life
with an exogenous state-independent probability, 1 − ζ, this will not affect any choice that he makes. A teen’s effective
discount factor would be β = ˆ β, where ˆ β is his subjective discount factor. In order to get the equilibrium discussed in
the text just set ˆ β = β.898 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
FIGURE 2
MATCHING SET, FINAL STEADY STATE
can expect from tomorrow on. Note that his current match with ˜ j will survive into next period
with probability (1 − δ).6 At this time the couple can decide to remain together in an absti-
nent relationship, switch to a promiscuous one, or break up. Recall that the function am (j, ˜ j)
reports the equilibrium probability that an abstinent match between j and ˜ j will occur next
period.7 Thus, the term (1 − δ)am (j, ˜ j)A m (j, ˜ j) represents the component of expected life-
time utility from next period onward that is associated with the possibility of an abstinent
match. Similarly, the part of expected lifetime utility linked to a promiscuous match is given
by (1 − δ)pm (j, ˜ j)Pm (j, ˜ j). Now a match may not occur next period because the pair breaks
up, either exogenously or endogenously. A match breaks up exogenously with probability δ
andendogenouslywithprobability(1 − δ)[1 − am (j, ˜ j) − pm (j, ˜ j)].Whenthematchbreaksup
person j must decide whether to enjoy his single life in either the abstinent or promiscuous class.
The term {δ + (1 − δ)[1 − am (j, ˜ j) − pm (j, ˜ j)]}max{A s (j), Ps (j)} gives the part of expected
lifetime utility that is associated with single life next period. When single at that time person j
will choose to join the social class (A or P) that maximizes expected lifetime utility so that he
will realize the level of bliss given by max{A s (j), Ps (j)}. The determination of the functions am
and pm is discussed below. They will be predicated upon the preferences that each party in the
match has toward a relationship, if they desire one at all. Last, note that time is implicitly a state
variable in the above recursion, since the costs of premarital sex will be changing over time in a
manner to be speciﬁed later. Therefore, individuals will be rationally incorporating any changes
in the cost of premarital sex into their decision making.8
6 Note that the pair, j and ˜ j, will move to a new location next period with probability 1 − ζ. But, by assumption j’s life
will continue on in identical fashion there, since the new location is an exact copy of the old one. Thus, there is no need
toincorporatethissurvivalprobabilityintotherecursion.Itdoesenterintothelawsofmotionforthetypedistributions.
7 As will be seen, these probabilities must be determined in equilibrium as a function of one’s partner’s decisions. It
is this factor that distinguishes a bilateral search model from the standard one, as typiﬁed by the job-search models of
Andolfatto and Gomme (1996), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), and Jovanovic (1987). Aiyagari et al. (2000) develop
a bilateral search model of marriage that is similar in some respects to the framework developed here.
8 Speciﬁcally, since the costs of premarital sex are assumed to be a function of time, so will be the functions
Am(j, ˜ j), As(j), Pm(j, ˜ j), Ps(j),am(j, ˜ j),pm(j, ˜ j), etc. The dependence of these functions on time is connoted bySOCIAL CHANGE 899
Alternatively, consider the case where j is alone in A. His expected lifetime utility is given by
the function A s(j), which reads
A s(j) = w + βµ
n  
i=1
as 
i [am (j, ˜ ji)A m (j, ˜ ji) + pm (j, ˜ ji)Pm (j, ˜ ji)]
+ β{(1 − µ) + µ
n  
i=1
as 
i [1 − am (j, ˜ ji) − pm (j, ˜ ji)]}max{A s (j), Ps (j)}.
(2)
Note that j’s draw for a partner, ˜ j, next period will depend upon the type distribution for
unmatched agents that will prevail in A at that time. This type distribution is given by the as 
i ’s,
with 0 ≤ as 
i ≤ 1 and
 n
i=1 as 
i = 1. This distribution is endogenously determined.
3.2. The Promiscuity Class, P. When person j matches with ˜ j in the promiscuity class, he
will realize an expected lifetime utility level of
Pm(j, ˜ j) = u + j − c + β(1 − δ)[am (j, ˜ j)A m (j, ˜ j) + pm (j, ˜ j)Pm (j, ˜ j)]
+ β{δ + (1 − δ)[1 − am (j, ˜ j) − pm (j, ˜ j)]}max{A s (j), Ps (j)}.
(3)
Intheaboveproblemtheindividualexperiencesajoyfromsex,netofcosts,intheamount j − c.
Unmatched person j will attain
Ps(j) = w + βµ
n  
i=1
ps 
i [am (j, ˜ ji)A m (j, ˜ ji) + pm (j, ˜ ji)Pm (j, ˜ ji)]
+ β{(1 − µ) + µ
n  
i=1
ps 
i [1 − am (j, ˜ ji) − pm (j, ˜ ji)]}max{A s (j), Ps (j)}.
(4)
Notethatj’sdrawforapartnernextperiodwilldependuponthetypedistributionforunmatched
agentsthatwillprevailinP atthattime,orthe ps 
i ’swith0 ≤ ps 
i ≤ 1and
 n
i=1 ps 
i = 1.Thevalue
of searching in either A or P next period will depend upon the type distributions, as  and ps ,
that exist in these classes then.
3.3. Social Class Membership Decision, Choosing A or P. Now, consider individual j who
is matched with partner ˜ j. An abstinent match with ˜ j may be individual j’s ﬁrst choice. Let the
indicator 1a(j, ˜ j) return a value of one if this is the case, and a value of zero otherwise. The
indicator function 1a( ˜ j, j) is then given by
1a(j, ˜ j) =
 
1, if A m(j, ˜ j) > max{Pm(j, ˜ j), A s(j), Ps(j)} (abstinent match is ﬁrst choice),
0, otherwise.
(5)
Observe that the analogous indicator function for person ˜ j will simply read 1a( ˜ j, j) = 1a
T(j, ˜ j),
where the subscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix. Now, it may be the case that person j
would prefer a promiscuous match with ˜ j, but this is not feasible. Still, j may prefer to live with ˜ j
in A, relative to living alone in either A or P. Let the indicator function 2a,s(j, ˜ j) return a value
of one if j prefers a match with ˜ j in A, relative to single life in either A or P, and a value of zero
the use of the prime symbol. A formal deﬁnition of the nonstationary rational expectations equilibrium that is being
modeled is provided in Section 4.900 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
otherwise. Thus, 2a,s(j, ˜ j) is given by
2a,s(j, ˜ j) =
 
1, if A m(j, ˜ j) > max{A s(j), Ps(j)} (abstinent match preferred to single life),
0, otherwise.
(6)
Person j’s preferences toward promiscuous matches can be analyzed in a similar fashion. To
this end, let the indicator function 1p(j, ˜ j) return a value of one if j would prefer to live with ˜ j
in P over all other options and a value of zero otherwise. This indicator function is deﬁned by
1p(j, ˜ j) =
 
1, if Pm(j, ˜ j) > max{A m(j, ˜ j), A s(j), Ps(j)} (promiscuous match is ﬁrst choice),
0, otherwise.
(7)
The situation where j prefers to live with ˜ j in P, relative to living alone in either A or P, can be
captured by the indicator function 2p,s(j, ˜ j):
2p,s(j, ˜ j) =
 
1, if Pm(j, ˜ j) > max{A s(j), Ps(j)} (promiscuous match preferred to single life),
0, otherwise.
(8)
Consider an unmatched agent. S/he must choose between searching for a prospective mate
in the abstinent or promiscuous class. Let 1
a,p
s (j) denote the decision rule for an unmatched
individual. In particular,
1a,p
s (j) =
 
1, if A s(j) > Ps(j), (single in A preferred to single in P),
0, otherwise.
(9)
Supposethatjand ˜ j havemet,eitherthroughaneworpre-existingmatch.Theprobabilitiesof
abstinentorpromiscuousrelationships,am(j, ˜ j)andpm(j, ˜ j),occurringcannowbeconstructed.
In particular,
am(j, ˜ j) = 1a(j, ˜ j)1a
T(j, ˜ j) + 1a(j, ˜ j)2p,s(j, ˜ j)1
p
T(j, ˜ j)2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j)/2
+ 1a
T(j, ˜ j)2
p,s
T (j, ˜ j)1p(j, ˜ j)2a,s(j, ˜ j)/2
+ 1a(j, ˜ j)[1 − 2p,s(j, ˜ j)][1 − 1a
T(j, ˜ j)]2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j)
+ 1a
T(j, ˜ j)[1 − 2
p,s
T (j, ˜ j)][1 − 1a(j, ˜ j)]2a,s(j, ˜ j),
(10)
and
pm(j, ˜ j) = 1p(j, ˜ j)1
p
T(j, ˜ j) + 1a(j, ˜ j)2p,s(j, ˜ j)1
p
T(j, ˜ j)2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j)/2
+ 1a
T(j, ˜ j)2
p,s
T (j, ˜ j)1p(j, ˜ j)2a,s(j, ˜ j)/2
+ [1 − 1p(j, ˜ j)]2p,s(j, ˜ j)1
p
T(j, ˜ j)
 
1 − 2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j)
 
+ [1 − 1
p
T(j, ˜ j)]2
p,s
T (j, ˜ j)1p(j, ˜ j)
 
1 − 2a,s(j, ˜ j)
 
.
(11)
Take the expression for am(j, ˜ j). It is not as formidable as it looks. The ﬁrst term gives
the situation where an abstinent match is both j’s and ˜ j’s ﬁrst choice. When this occurs
1a(j, ˜ j)1a
T(j, ˜ j) = 1. The remaining terms enumerate situations where an abstinent match is
not one person’s ﬁrst choice for a match, but they still prefer it to single life.SOCIAL CHANGE 901
Consider the second term. Suppose that person j’s ﬁrst choice is an abstinent relationship,
but she would be willing to accept a promiscuous one as opposed to being single. In this cir-
cumstance 1a(j, ˜ j)2p,s(j, ˜ j) = 1, and is zero otherwise. Additionally, suppose that her partner
wants a promiscuous match the most, but prefers an abstinent relationship to single life. Here,
1
p
T(j, ˜ j)2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j) = 1. How will the couple resolve this difference in tastes? Simply assume that
they just ﬂip a coin between the two alternatives. The odds of an abstinent match are then
1a(j, ˜ j)2p,s(j, ˜ j)1
p
T(j, ˜ j)2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j)/2 = 1/2. This expression will return a value of zero in any
other circumstance. The third term just reports the situation when the roles for j and ˜ j are
reversed. Therefore, when two people j and ˜ j have the above-mentioned difference in tastes,
half of the time the match will be resolved in j’s favor, whereas the other half it will be decided
to ˜ j’s beneﬁt. (This is also true on average within a given match over time.)
Atﬁrstsight,themixingsituationmayseemstrangeinthatcertainpairsmighthavesexinsome
periodsandnotinothers.Thinkaboutthesetypesofrelationshipsashavinganintermediatelevel
of sexual activity; they are less active than pairings with pm(j, ˜ j) = 1 and more active than ones
witham(j, ˜ j) = 1.Thiscouldbeimportantformodelingissuessuchasteenagepregnancy,orthe
incidences of diseases such as AIDS/HIV. In a more general model, one of the parties may want
to make some sort of transfer to the other in order to attain what he or she desires. The transfer
could be in terms of effort or gifts. One could think about these transfers as being undertaken
via some sort of bargaining scheme or as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium where they
are explicitly priced. Here matches would be (more) efﬁcient. In lieu of these possibilities, the
above lottery scheme reconciles the differences in tastes about as best as can be done.
The fourth term speciﬁes the case where person j will refuse a promiscuous match. If j’s ﬁrst
choice is an abstinent match, and she’ll refuse a promiscuous one, then 1a(j, ˜ j)[1 − 2p,s(j, ˜ j)] =
1. Likewise, when ˜ j’s best option is a promiscuous match, but he’ll accept an abstinent one,
then [1 − 1a
T(j, ˜ j)]2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j) = 1. The odds of an abstinent match in this situation are given by
1a(j, ˜ j)[1 − 2p,s(j, ˜ j)][1 − 1a
T(j, ˜ j)]2
a,s
T (j, ˜ j) = 1.Again,itiseasytodeducethatthisexpression
will be zero in any other situation. The roles between j and ˜ j are reversed in the ﬁfth term.
Note that by construction all of the terms in (10) are mutually exclusive and that am(j, ˜ j) ∈
{0,1/2,1}. Likewise, pm(j, ˜ j) ∈{ 0,1/2,1}. Last the odds of no relationship are just simply given
by 1 − am(j, ˜ j) − pm(j, ˜ j) ∈{ 0,1}.
Observe that equations (1) to (11) jointly determine a solution for the value func-
tions A m(j, ˜ j), A s(j), Pm(j, ˜ j), Ps(j), the decision rules 1a(j, ˜ j),2a,s(j, ˜ j),...,1
a,p
s (j), and the
matching functions, am(j, ˜ j) and pm(j, ˜ j), contingent upon the type distributions of unmatched
agents in A and P,o rt h eas
i ’s and ps
i ’s.
4. EQUILIBRIUM
Computingasolutiontothemodelinvolvescalculatingthetimepathsforthetypedistributions
of unmatched agents in A and P. The solutions to the recursions (2) and (4) depend directly
upon these distributions—the as
i ’s and ps
i ’s. Note these distributions will indirectly inﬂuence (1)
and(3)aswell.Hence,theequilibriumsocialclassmembershipfunctions(9)to(11)willdepend
upon these distributions. In turn, the evolution of these distributions will be functions of these
membership decisions, am,ap, and 1
a,p
s . Let Ma(j, ˜ j) denote the nonnormalized distribution
over matched pairs in A, and Sa(j) denote the analogous (nonnormalized) distribution over
singles.Likewise, Mp(j, ˜ j)and Sp(j)willrepresentthedistributionsformatchedandunmatched
agents in P. Note that as
i = Sa(ji)/ kSa(jk) and ps
i = Sp(ji)/ kSp(jk). Write the law of motion
for these distributions as
(Ma , Sa , Mp , Sp ) = L(Ma, Sa, Mp, Sp,am,ap,1a,p
s ). (12)
The operator L is fully speciﬁed in Greenwood and Guner (2009b). Thus, computing an equi-
librium for the model involves solving a ﬁxed-point problem.902 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
Deﬁnition. For a given time path describing the costs of premarital sex, {ct}∞
t=1,
and some initial type distributions, Ma
1(j, ˜ j), M
p
1 (j, ˜ j), Sa
1(j), and S
p
1 (j), a nonstation-
ary rational expectations equilibrium is represented by time paths for the value func-
tions, {A m
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{A s
t(j)}∞
t=1,{Pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1, and {Ps
t (j)}∞
t=1, the decision rules, {1a
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,
{2
a,s
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{1
p
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{2
p,s
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1, and {1
a,p
s,t (j)}∞
t=1, the matching functions for cou-
ples, {am
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1 and {pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1, and the type distributions, {Ma
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{M
p
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,
{Sa
t (j)}∞
t=1, and {S
p
t (j)}∞
t=1, such that
1. Thesequenceofvaluefunctions,{A m
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{A s
t(j)}∞
t=1,{Pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,and{Ps
t (j)}∞
t=1,
solve the recursions (1) to (4), given the time paths for the matching functions for
couples, {am
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1 and {pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1, and the type distributions for singles, {Sa
t (j)}∞
t=1,
and {S
p
t (j)}∞
t=1. [Recall that as
i,t = Sa
t (ji)/ kSa
t (jk) and ps
i,t = S
p
t (ji)/ kS
p
t (jk).]
2. The sequence of decisions rules and matching functions {1a
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,
{2
a,s
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{1
p
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{2
p,s
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{1
a,p
s,t (j)}∞
t=1,{am
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1, and {pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1
satisfy (5) to (11), given the time paths for the value functions,
{A m
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{A s
t(j)}∞
t=1,{Pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1, and {Ps
t (j)}∞
t=1 and the type distributions for
singles, {Sa
t (j)}∞
t=1, and {S
p
t (j)}∞
t=1.
3. The sequence for the type distributions, {Ma
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{M
p
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1,{Sa
t (j)}∞
t=1, and
{S
p
t (j)}∞
t=1, solve (12), given the social class decision rule for singles,{1
a,p
s,t (j)}∞
t=1, and the
matching functions, {am
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1 and {pm
t (j, ˜ j)}∞
t=1.
At a general level not much more can be said about the properties of the economy’s equilib-
rium. Some insight into the model, however, can be gleaned by undertaking the following three
tasks in turn. First, the solution to the model’s steady state will be examined. Second, the transi-
tionaldynamicsforthemodelwillbefullycharacterizedforthespecialcaseofaonce-and-for-all
change in c. Third, the solution to the above equilibrium will be computed numerically in order
to speak to the issue at hand, the change in sexual mores—for the algorithm see Greenwood
and Guner (2009b). After all, the question of whether or not the above framework is capable
of explaining the change in sexual mores is quantitative in nature.
5. STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS
Supposethatcisconstantovertime.Whatwouldasteadystatefortheabovemodellooklike?
It seems reasonable to conjecture that those who enjoy sex, relatively speaking, will circulate
within the promiscuous class, and those who do not, will not. In order to pursue this conjecture,
suppose that there exists some threshold type, jb, such that {j1,...,jb}∈A and {jb+1,...,jn}∈
P.Infact,onemightsuspectthat jb < c < jb+1;thatis,thosewhohaveajoyforsexthatishigher
than its expected cost will be a member of P, and those who do not will associate with people
in A. (In order to simplify the analysis, without any real loss of generality, always suppose that
c lies strictly between two j’s.) If this conjecture is true, then a partner’s type in each class will
not matter since the world is split into two noncommunicating social groups. That is, anyone in
A will be willing to accept an abstinent match with anybody else in A, whereas all individuals
in P will take a promiscuous relationship with any other person in P.
LEMMA 1( S EPARATE WORLDS). There exists a steady-state equilibrium such that ji ∈ A for all
ji < c, and ji ∈ P for ji > c.
PROOF. See the Appendix, Section A.
Given the above lemma, there exists a steady state where there is a dividing line in the j
distribution between the two classes given by c. Individuals with a j < c choose to live abstinent
lives,andthosewitha j > cpromiscuousones.Thesteadystateofastandardsearchmodelwould
notexhibitthistypeofefﬁcientmatching.Recallthatφi denotesthenumberofpeopleoftype ji.
Hence, the (nonnormalized) type distributions in A and P will be given by {φ1,...,φ b,0,...,0}SOCIAL CHANGE 903
and {0,...,0,φ b+1,...,φ n}, respectively, where b solves
jb < c < jb+1. (13)
The number of people circulating in A is
 b
i=1 φi, so that the size of the population in P is given
by
#P = 1 −
b  
i=1
φi. (14)
In a steady state the fraction of people who are attached in either class A or P will be given by
α =
ζµ
1 − ζ(1 − δ) + ζµ
, (15)
so that the fraction who are unattached is
1 − α =
1 − ζ(1 − δ)
1 − ζ(1 − δ) + ζµ
.
Note that α does not depend upon the properties of the type distribution or on the shape of
J(j). This is also true for any other statistic describing the steady-state properties of matching
withinaclass.Last,notethatthesizeofthepromiscuousclassinasteady-stateisanonincreasing
function of the cost of premarital sex, as the following lemma states.
LEMMA 2( S EXUAL REVOLUTION). The steady-state number of people engaging in premarital
sex (weakly) increases with a fall in the cost of premarital sex.
PROOF.A s c decreases the b that solves (13) will fall, given that j1 < j2 < ···< jn. The result
then follows from (14). 
6. TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS
6.1. The Impact of a Once-and-for-All Decline in c. As an aid toward gaining some un-
derstanding about how the transitional dynamics for the model work, consider the impact of
a once-and-for-all decline in c from c to c. In particular, suppose that the economy is initially
resting in a steady state associated with c = c. In line with the analysis of Section 5, there will
existabsuchthat jb < c < jb+1.ThetypedistributioninAwillbegivenby{φ1,...,φ b,0,...,0},
and the one in P by {0,...,0,φ b+1,...,φ n}. In each class a fraction α, as speciﬁed by (15), of
the populace will be matched. Suppose that c suddenly drops to c, and stays at that value for-
ever after. Then, there will be new steady-state type distributions in A and P represented by
{φ1,...,φ d,0,...,0} and {0,...,0,φ d+1,...,φ n}, where jd <c< jd+1 – assume a large enough
shift in c so that d < b.
Now, think about the following process of convergence between the two steady states, which
will be veriﬁed later:
1. To begin with, take an attached (j, ˜ j) pair in A in the old steady state. If (j, ˜ j) ∈
{jd+1,...,jb}×{jd+1,...,jb} they will move immediately to P. Simply put, why should
these individuals wait? There will be α
 b
i=d+1
 b
k=d+1 φi φk agents in this category,
where α is given by (15). Since the adjustment here is immediate, this case is a force for
rapid transitional dynamics.
2. Likewise, consider unattached individuals in A.I fj ∈{ jd+1,...,jb} they too will
immediately enter P. Again, what would be the advantage to waiting? There are
(1 − α)
 b
i=d+1 φi such agents. Thus, the model’s transitional dynamics will be very fast904 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
onthisaccount.Notethatthisimpliesthattheone-step-aheadunmatchedtypedistribu-
tions in A and P will have the forms {as 
1 ,...,as 
d ,0,...,0} and {0,...,0, ps 
d+1,...,ps 
n}.
Byemployingsimilarreasoning,itcanbededucedthatthislatterfeaturewillholdalong
all points of the transition path.
3. There may be matches in the old steady state for which j ∈{ j1,...,jd} and ˜ j ∈
{jd+1,...,jb},yetitremainsoptimalfor(j, ˜ j)tostayattachedinA.Hereperson ˜ j’stype
is not high enough to warrant breaking up a relationship with j and searching by himself
in P. There are two types of situations here. Those where person j is willing to engage in
a mixing relationship [am(j, ˜ j) = 1/2], and those where she is not [am(j, ˜ j) = 1]. There
will be α
 d
i=1
 b
k=d+1 am(ji, ˜ jk)φi φk people in this situation. The survival rate for these
matches is ζ(1 − δ). The ˜ j’s who are still around will switch to P after a breakup.
4. Analogously, there may be matches in the old steady state for which j ∈{j1,...,jd} and
˜ j ∈{jd+1,...,jb} where it is optimal for (j, ˜ j) to move to P. Here individual j’s unfa-
vorable view of the net gain from sex with ˜ j is not bad enough to justify terminating her
relationship with ˜ j and searching alone in A. There will be α
 d
i=1
 b
k=d+1 pm(ji, ˜ jk)φi
φk agents in this position. The survival rate for these matches is ζ(1 − δ). The surviving
j’s will enter A after a breakup.
5. Finally,theremaybesomematches(j, ˜ j) ∈{j1,...,jd}×{jd+1,...,jb}intheoldsteady
state for which it is optimal for the couple to break up. Here, person j will search for a
new mate in A whereas ˜ j will look in P. There will be α
 d
i=1
 b
k=d+1[1 − am(ji, ˜ jk) −
pm(ji, ˜ jk)]φi φk agents in this case. Since the adjustment here is immediate, this case
speaks for rapid transitional dynamics.
The above line of reasoning suggests that the lemma below should hold—the above logic is
veriﬁed during the course of the proof.
LEMMA 3( R APID TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS). Upon a once-and-for-all decrease in c, the (non-
normalized) type distribution in A immediately jumps from
{φ1,...,φ b,0,...,0}
to
 
φ1 − α
b  
k=d+1
pm(j1, ˜ jk)φ1φk,...,φ d − α
b  
k=d+1
pm(jd, ˜ jk)φdφk,
α
d  
h=1
am(jh, ˜ jd+1)φhφd+1,...,α
d  
h=1
am(jh, ˜ jb)φhφb,0,...,0
 
,
where d < b. The i-step-ahead type distribution in A (for i ≥ 1) is given by
 
φ1 − [ζ(1 − δ)]iα
b  
k=d+1
pm(j1, ˜ jk)φ1φk,...,φ d − [ζ(1 − δ)]iα
b  
k=d+1
pm(jd, ˜ jk)φdφk,
[ζ(1 − δ)]iα
d  
h=1
am(jh, ˜ jd+1)φhφd+1,...,[ζ(1 − δ)]iα
d  
h=1
am(jh, ˜ jb)φhφb,0,...,0
 
.
(16)
PROOF. See the Appendix, Section A
To summarize, following a once-and-for-all decline in c some matched couples will imme-
diately move from A to P. Sometimes one member might move somewhat reluctantly, in the
sense that he would prefer a match in A instead of P. This ideal situation is not on the table,
because his partner prefers a relationship in P. Over time these matches will break up exoge-
nously and the (surviving) low-j partner will return to A. These matches are captured by theSOCIAL CHANGE 905
[ζ(1 − δ)]iα
 b
k=d+1 pm(jh, ˜ jk)φhφk terms (for h = 1,...,d) in (16). Similarly, some matched in-
dividuals will remain in A because her partner refuses to have a promiscuous match. These
high- ˜ j individuals will drift into P as their matches break up, so long as they survive. The
[ζ(1 − δ)]iα
 d
h=1 am(jh, ˜ jk)φhφk terms (for k = d + 1,...,b) represent this situation.
It is readily apparent from (16) that the model will generate rapid transitional dynamics when
δ is large or ζ is small, that is, when matches break up quickly or when teenage life is short.
Last, there is a special case where the numbers of abstinent and promiscuous matches jump
immediately to their new steady-state values. This is established in the corollary below. This
happens when all the matches discussed in Points 3 and 4 involve mixing [am(j, ˜ j) = pm(j, ˜ j) =
1/2]. Whether or not this will transpire depends upon parameter values, etc. This situation
occurs in the simulation discussed in Section 9. Note that although at the aggregate level the
number of people engaged in abstinent and promiscuous relationships is constant over time, at
the microlevel there is still movement between social classes that dampens out in line with (16).
In this case, at the microlevel the ﬂows into and out of the two social classes balance each other
exactly, as is made clear in the proof of the corollary.
COROLLARY 1( I NSTANTANEOUS AGGREGATE DYNAMICS). Suppose that for all matched pairs
(j, ˜ j) with j < c and ˜ j > c it is optimal to mix; i.e., assume that am(j, ˜ j) = pm(j, ˜ j) = 1/2 for all
j < c and ˜ j > c. Then, #At =
 d
h=1 φh and #Pt =
 n
h=d+1 φh for all t.
PROOF. Take all matched pairs of a particular type (j, ˜ j) with j < c and ˜ j > c. By the mixing
condition, half of the matches will be in At, the other half in Pt. Now, every period δ of the
surviving matches will breakup in each set. Individuals of type j will go to At+1 whereas those
of type ˜ j will move to Pt+1. Since for every breakup in At there is one in Pt, the number of
individuals in A and P will not change over time. 
Return now to the issue under study, the rise in premarital sex over the last century. In order
to analyze this issue, something must be inputted into the simulation for the time path of costs
that governs premarital sex, {ct}∞
t=1. Turn to this subject now.
7. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN CONTRACEPTION
In 1900 engaging in premarital sex was a very risky business. Roughly 71% of females would
have gotten pregnant (had they engaged in sex for a year at normal frequencies). These odds
had dropped to 28% by 2002. The reduction in the chance of pregnancy occurred for two
reasons:technologicalimprovementincontraceptivesandthedisseminationofknowledgeabout
contraception and reproduction.
Coitus interruptus has been practiced since ancient times and is mentioned in the Bible.9 This
was the most important method of contraception historically. The condom has a long history. In
the 18th century, Casanova reported using the “English riding coat.” Handbills were circulated
in England advertising condoms. One said (for a picture see Himes, 1963, p. 198):
To guard yourself from shame or fear,
Votaries to Venus, hasten here;
None in my wares ever found a ﬂaw,
Self preservation’s nature’s law.
Early condoms were used more to prevent venereal disease than pregnancy. They were ex-
pensive and uncomfortable. The diffusion of condoms was promoted by the vulcanization of
rubber in 1843–44. They were still expensive in 1850, selling for $5 a dozen (McLaren, 1990, p.
184), which translates into $34 a dozen relative to today’s real wages. So, even when washed
and reused, they were too expensive for the masses to use. Another major innovation was the
introduction of the latex condom in the 1930s, which dramatically reduced cost and increased
9 This history is compiled from Himes (1964), McLaren (1990), and Potts and Campbell (2002).906 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
TABLE 1
CONTRACEPTION USE AT FIRST PREMARITAL INTERCOURSE, PERCENT
Method 1900 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–82 83–88 85–89 90–94 95–98 99–02
None 61.4 61.4 54.2 55.6 53.5 46.9 34.6 36.1 29.7 27.2 21.2
Pill – 4.2 8.6 12.1 12.8 14.2 12.1 19.7 14.1 15.3 16.0
Condom 9.42 21.9 24.0 21.0 22.0 26.7 41.8 36.4 49.9 49.8 51.2
Withdrawal 11.19 7.3 9.5 7.3 7.5 8.4 8.9 5.6 3.5 4.9 7.3
Other 17.99 5.3 3.7 4.0 4.2 3.8 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.8 4.3
TABLE 2
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACEPTION (ANNUAL FAILURE RATES, PERCENT)
Method 1900 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–82 83–88 85–89 90–94 95–98 99–02
None 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0
Pill 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 3.4 3.4 5.5 5.5 5.5
Condom 45.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 11.0 11.0 14.5 14.5 14.5
Withdrawal 59.2 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 23.0 23.0
Other 50.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
quality. Other methods of birth control were also used, such as a variety of intrauterine devices.
Casanova mentions using half of a lemon as a contraceptive device. This could have been quite
effective, since it acted as barrier-cum-spermicidal agent. In 1797, Bentham advocated the use
of the sponge to keep down the size of the poor population. The rubber diaphragm entered
service around 1890. It was expensive and had to be ﬁt by a doctor. This limited its use to those
who were relatively well off. The pill emblematizes modern contraception. In 1960, the Food
andDrugAdministrationapprovedtheuseofit,whichwasaremarkablescientiﬁcachievement
involving the synthesis of a hormone designed to fool the reproductive system.
The dissemination of knowledge about contraception and reproduction was also very impor-
tant. The modern birth control movement started about 1914 when Margaret Sanger published
a pamphlet, Family Limitation, for which she was prosecuted. It described the use of condoms,
douching, and suppositories. She became a tireless crusader for birth control clinics. She opened
the ﬁrst clinic in 1919. Nine days later the police came. The ﬁrst continually effective birth con-
trol clinic was operational in 1923, according to Himes (1963). Sanger promoted the use of the
diaphragm through the clinics.
Theuseofvariousmethodsofcontraceptionduringpremaritalintercoursewithaﬁrstpartner
and their efﬁcacies are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The data for contraceptive use during ﬁrst
premarital intercourse starts in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 2002 the number of people
not using any birth control fell by a remarkable 40 percentage points. The increased use of
contraception may derive from two factors. First, technological improvement has made them
both effective and easy to use. As more and more teenagers engage in sex on this account,
one would see an increase in their use. Second, the diffusion of contraceptives may be slow, as
with any new product. The birth control movement has made information about contraceptives
widely available (in a manner similar to advertising for other products) and access to them easy.
Thisgreatlyspeduptheirdiffusion.Howmuchisanopenquestionforwhichitwouldbedifﬁcult
to provide a quantitative answer. The condom is the most popular method of birth control, and
itsusehasactuallyincreasedovertime,notwithstandingtheintroductionofthebirthcontrolpill.
Today more than half of people use condoms for premarital sexual relationships with their ﬁrst
partner. According to Darroch and Singh (1999), the rise of condom users played a signiﬁcant
role in the decline of pregnancies among teenagers during the 1990s. The increase in the use
of condoms was inﬂuenced by the expansion of formal reproductive health education duringSOCIAL CHANGE 907
the period. On this, Ku et al. (1992) show that sex education about AIDS, birth control, and
resisting sexual activity is associated with more consistent condom use. Furthermore, Lindberg
et al. (2000) report that formal sex education on these topics expanded signiﬁcantly during the
1990s.
In order to measure the decline in risk associated with premarital sex during the 20th century,
an estimate must be made for both the use and effectiveness of contraception in 1900. Take the
use of contraception in 1900, ﬁrst. Set the fraction of non users in 1900 to the values observed
in 1960–64 period (Table 1). Clearly, this is a conservative assumption, since use has been
increasing steadily over time. Himes (1963) provides information on the fraction of married
femaleswhousedifferentmethodsin1930s.Assumethattheselectionpatternforcontraception
byyoungfemaleusersduringtheirﬁrstpremaritalintercoursewassimilartothepatternselected
bymarriedwomen.Ifonealsoassumesthattheselectionpatternin1900wasthesameastheone
displayed in the 1930s (again a conservative assumption), contraceptive use at ﬁrst premarital
intercourse can be constructed for 1900.10
Turn now to the effectiveness of contraception in 1900. A number for effectiveness in 1900 is
constructed as follows: First, Kopp (1934) reports a 45% failure rate for condoms and a 59.2%
failure rate for withdrawal. His numbers are based on preclinical use by married couples who
sought advice from the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau in New York City between
1925 and 1929. Although it seems quite high, a 45% failure rate for condoms is quite close to
other estimates from the same period.11 Why was the failure rate for withdrawal so high then as
well?Themainreasonwasthatpartialwithdrawalwasconsideredaseffectiveascompletewith-
drawal, and despite better scientiﬁc evidence this practice did not change quickly—see Brodie
(1994). Second, the other methods that people used around 1920 were not much more effective,
either. Kopp (1934) reports the following failure rates: douche, 70.6%; jelly or suppository, 46.6;
lactation, 56.6; pessary 28.1; sponge, 50, and safe period, 59.7. Hence, it is safe to presume that
the failure rate for other methods at the time was no more than 50%. Finally, following Hatcher
et al. (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004), assume that using no method and simply taking
your chances had an 85% failure rate.
Since the 1960s evidence on the effectiveness of different contraceptives, for both their ideal
and typical use, is quite systematic. From that time on failure rates have been measured as the
percentageofwomenwhobecomepregnantduringtheﬁrstyearofuse.Bycontrast,thestatistics
from earlier studies, such as Kopp (1934), are based on married women who used birth control
clinics. First, based on several studies from the early 1960s, Tietze (1970) reports a 10–20%
failure rate for condoms. According to Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004),
the failure rates for condoms were pretty constant at 15–20% during the 1970s and early 1980s,
and then declined to about 11% in the mid-1980s. Somewhat mysteriously, they rose slightly
in the 1990s. Hence, the condom’s failure rate has fallen from 45 to 14.5%, a (continuously
compounded) decline of about 113%, both due to technological improvement and increased
knowledge about its appropriate use.
Second,ascanbeseeninTable2,thepillisthemosteffectivemethodofcontraception.Itwas
introduced in the 1960s. Its initial failure rates were about 5–10%. They declined to 3.35% by
1989, again due to both technological improvement and better education about its use. Again,
the failure rates rose slightly during the 1990s. Third, even the effectiveness of withdrawal has
increased over time; this shows the importance of education. Finally, during this period the
effectiveness of other methods improved as well. New and much more effective methods, such
as injections and implants, were introduced in the 1990s.
10 The results are almost identical if, instead, the 1900 values are set to the ones observed in 1960–64 for teenage
femaleusers.Sincethepillwasnotyetintroducedin1900,forthesecalculationsallocatethesmallpercentageoffemales
in the pill cell into the “other” category.
11 Tone (2001) cites two scientiﬁc studies before the Food and Drug Administration started inspecting condoms in
the late 1930s. One of these studies from 1924 reports a 50% failure rate, whereas a later one from 1934 to 1935 reports
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FIGURE 3
(I) RISE IN PREMARITAL SEX, U.S. DATA AND THE MODEL WITH AND WITHOUT ABORTION (LEFT PANEL). (II)E XPECTED COST OF
PREMARITAL SEX (RIGHT PANEL). THE LINE MARKED ‘DATA’ PLOTS THE EXPECTED RISK OF PREGNANCY (ANNUALIZED, PERCENT)
GIVEN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND USE OF CONTRACEPTION.T HE OTHER LINE SHOWS THE EXPECTED COST OF PREMARITAL SEX
GIVEN THE AVAILABILITY OF ABORTION.
So what is the upshot of this analysis? By combining the information on the effectiveness
and use of contraceptives contained in Tables 1 and 2, one can get a measure of the extent of
technological innovation in birth control. In order to do this, for each year take an average
over the effectiveness of each method of birth control listed in Table 2. When doing this weight
each practice by its yearly frequency of use, shown in Table 1. The upshot of this calculation is
illustrated (by the line marked “Data”) in the right-hand panel of Figure 3, which presents the
riskiness of premarital sex. Even when using conservative estimates for 1900, this riskiness has
fallen by (a continuously compounded) 94%, from about 72% in 1900 to 28% in 2002. Now, the
series shown in Figure 3 has an important endogenous component in it, speciﬁcally the choice
of contraceptive used.
Why individuals would choose to use one method over another is not modeled in the analysis.
Doing so could be difﬁcult and the beneﬁt questionable. The same issue also arises for the
conventionally measured aggregate total factor productivity series used by macroeconomists,
althoughitisnotastransparentandperhapsislessproblematic.Thisserieseffectivelyconstructs
total factor productivity across plants using a Divisia index. Of course the technology used by
any particular plant is an endogenous variable, and there is a large variance in the technological
practiceadoptedacrossplants.Theimportantthingtonoteisthatthedatausedforconstructing
theriskofpregnancyreportedinFigure3areconditioneduponanindividualhavingsex.Hence,
the data used are not directly affected by the decision to have sex or not, which is the margin
under study. That is, the series plotted shows the average failure rate over time conditioned
upon a person deciding to engage in premarital sex.
8. CALIBRATION
Prior to simulating the model, values must be assigned to the various parameters governing
tastes, the matching technology, and the type distribution. Toward this end, set up the type
distribution, J(j), so that it approximates a truncated normal, where the truncation points areSOCIAL CHANGE 909
2.5standarddeviationsoneithersideofthemean.Anevenlyspacedgridof300pointsisusedfor
J. Hence, J(j) will be governed by two parameters, namely, its mean, j, and standard deviation,
ςj. Given this, there are eight parameters to pick: µ,δ,ζ,β,u,w,j, and ςj. This is done in the
following manner:12
1. Matching parameters, µ,δ, and ζ. In 2002, roughly 34.4% of teenagers between the ages
of 15 and 19 had coitus within the last three months.13 Adolescent relationships are
pretty short. On average a teen’s ﬁrst sexual relationship lasts for almost six months.
The median duration of an adolescent relationship is about 13 months.14 Construct a
simple Markov chain to match these two facts. Let teenagers match with probably µ
and break up with probability δ. Given the short duration of teenage relationships, take
the model period to be a quarter. This implies that there will be 20 periods of teenage
life between the ages of 15 and 19, inclusive. The mean duration of a relationship is
given by 1/δ. Thus, let 1/δ = 13/3 so that δ = 0.231. This high destruction rate speaks
for relatively fast transitional dynamics, in light of Lemma 3. Next, choose a value for µ
sothatthestatisticalmechanicsofthe(µ,δ)-matchingtechnologyimplythatonaverage
a teenager will be sexually active 34.4% of time between ages 15 and 19. Assume that a
teenager starts off unmatched at the end of his/her 14th year. Let πi represent the odds
of a teenager being matched i periods down the road. Thus, 1 − πi is the probability of
being unmatched then. These odds are given by
 
πi
1 − πi
 
=
 
1 − δµ
δ 1 − µ
 i  
0
1
 
, for i = 1,...,20. (17)
The fraction of a promiscuous teenager’s life spent in a sexually active relationship is
then
 20
i=1 πi/20. Therefore, pick µ so that 0.75 ×
 20
i=1 πi/20 = 0.344, where it will be
assumed that 75% of the 2002 population is sexually active—see below. This results in
µ = 0.222. Last, a 20-period teenage life dictates setting ζ = 1 − 1/20.
2. Type distribution parameters, j and ςj. Now, in 1900 only 6% of unmarried teenage girls
engaged in premarital sex. This had risen to 75% by 2002. The model is solved for two
steady states. The ﬁrst one mimics the year 1900. For this one, set c = c1900 = 0.2729,
which is the quarterly failure rate for 1900. The second steady state matches the year
2002. Here, pick c = c2002 = 0.0802.15 Last, the mean and standard deviation, j and ςj,
are speciﬁed so that in the ﬁrst steady state 6% of people engage in premarital sex,
whereas in the second 75% do. Note that for the model, the probability of a person
ﬁnding a mate in their teenage years is given by χ ≡ 1 − (1 − µ)(1 − ζ)/[1 − (1 − µ)ζ.
Hence, Equations (13) and (14) should be solved while setting χ × #P1900 = 0.06 and
χ × #P2002 = 0.75. The result is j = 0.1450 and ςj = 0.0857. Lemma 1 implies that in a
steadystatethenumberofpeopleinAandP dependssolelyonthecostofsex,c,andthe
shape of the J(j) distribution, as governed here by j and ςj. Therefore, for given values
ofc,µandζ,theaboveproceduresolvesthetwosteady-stateequationsdeterminingthe
number of people engaged in premarital sex for the two unknowns j and ςj. Given the
12 The model is an inﬁnite horizon framework. The real world is made up of ﬁnitely lived overlapping generations.
Every year a new generation of young people enters into the dating world for the ﬁrst time, whereas members of older
cohorts exit due to marriage. This mismatch between the data and the model appears to be second order, as the results
in Section 9 will show.
13 This number is taken from Abma et al. (2004, table 4, p. 19).
14 Sources: Ryan et al. (2003) and Udry and Bearman (1998). According to Udry and Bearman (1998), the median
duration is about 10 months when the respondent is a male and about 13 months when the respondent is a female. The
latter is taken here, although the results are very similar if, instead, a duration of 10 months is targeted.
15 According to the calculations in Section 7, the risk of pregnancy was 0.7205 per year in 1900 and 0.2843 per
year in 2002. If the probability of pregnancy over a year is ˆ c, then take the quarterly probability, c, to be given by
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setup of the model, there does not seem to be another so-natural criteria for choosing j
and ςj. Especially because statistics describing the properties of matching within a class,
suchastheaveragenumberofpartnersforasexuallyactiveperson,donotdependupon
the shape of the J(j) distribution, as was mentioned in Section 5.
3. Taste parameters, β,u, and w. Given that a period is one quarter, set β = 0.99. In the
simulation the values chosen for u and w do not matter very much. In fact, theoretically
they do not affect the steady state at all, as Lemma 1 makes clear. In light of this, simply
setu − w = 1andletw =|min{j1,0}| + c1900.Thelatterrestrictionensuresthatlifetime
utility is always positive.16
The model is now ready to be simulated.
9. SOCIAL CHANGE: THE COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT
Go back in time to 1900. Premarital sex is dangerous, since a young woman runs a 72% risk
of pregnancy. Given this, the vast majority of youth choose to live abstinent lifestyles. Sex is a
taboosubject.Allofthisisabouttochangeduetotechnologicalprogressincontraception.Over
time the risk of pregnancy declines. This changes the cost and beneﬁt calculation of engaging
in premarital sex. Slowly more and more people engage in premarital sex so that by 2002 a
substantial majority of teens are experiencing it. Can the model capture this pattern of social
change?
In order to answer this question, start the model economy off in a steady state resembling the
situationin1900.Then,subjectittothetimepathoftechnologicalprogressforcontraceptionthat
is observed in the data from 1900 to 2002, as calculated in Section 7. When doing this assume
for simplicity that there is no technological advance in contraception after 2002. Given this
the economy will eventually converge to a situation resembling 2002, given Point 2 in Section 8.
Now,calculatetheresultingtimepathforthetypedistributionsintheabstinentandpromiscuous
classesforthemodeleconomy.Doestheresultingtimepathforteenagersengaginginpremarital
sex resemble the pattern observed in the U.S. data? That is the question.
9.1. 2002 Steady State. In order to glean some insight into the model’s mechanics, focus
for a moment on the matching set that obtains in the ﬁnal steady state. This is portrayed in
Figure 2. The horizontal axes simply plot j and ˜ j pairs, or the types for the potential match
(where1isthelowestindexfortype,and300thehighest).Thevaryingheightsontheverticalaxis
denote different matching situations. For instance, the trough in the front reﬂects the situation
where both types’ﬁ rst choice is an abstinent match. The adjacent block on the left reports
a mixing situation [am(j, ˜ j) = pm(j, ˜ j) = 1/2]. Here j would prefer an abstinent match and
˜ j a promiscuous one. Half of the matches in this zone will be abstinent, and the other half
promiscuous. The other adjacent block on the right reﬂects the same situation with the positions
of j and ˜ j reversed. These matches were discussed in Points 3 and 4 of Section 6.1. Hence, they
will not occur in steady state, since all j < c will be in A and all j > c will be in P. Since in
the ﬁgure only mixing situations occur when couples have differing views on the desirability
of sex, the corollary to Lemma 3 suggests that the model’s transitional dynamics will be rapid.
This turns out to be true. Now, move to the large area in the corner at the back of the ﬁgure.
This block gives the (j, ˜ j) combinations where a promiscuous match is the ﬁrst choice of both
individuals. Note that according to Figure 2, no agent rejects a match; i.e., the blocks exhaust
the type space. This result is sensitive to the values of c,δ, and µ. Promiscuity is more costly the
higher is c. A match becomes more valuable, relative to searching, as µ and δ fall. When µ is
low it is hard to ﬁnd a mate, and when δ is small the beneﬁts from a relationship are enduring.
Therefore, when both µ and δ are low an agent is reluctant to decline a potential partner.
16 This restriction is not needed for the theory and does not impact on the numerical results. It is imposed because
the programming language used has some very fast built-in commands that can be employed when the matrices in the
analysis are positive.SOCIAL CHANGE 911
FIGURE 4
(I) INCREASE IN TEENAGE PREGNANCIES, U.S. DATA AND MODEL (LEFT-HAND PANEL); (II)T HE PREVALENCE OF ABORTION IN THE
U.S. (RIGHT-HAND PANEL)
9.2. Transitional Dynamics. Now, turn to the transitional dynamics. As can be seen from
the left-hand panel of Figure 3, the model (marked “Baseline”) has little trouble replicating the
rapidriseinpremaritalsexoverthelastcentury.Indeed,Lemma3suggeststhenumberofpeople
engaging in premarital sex will response quickly to declines in the cost of sex. Furthermore,
given the matching patterns exhibited in Figure 2, the corollary hints that reaction could be
instantaneous. Note that the model gives an S-shaped diffusion pattern for the increase in
premarital sex, a pattern also visible in data. This is characteristic of technological adoption,
here contraceptives.17 Observe that the sharpest rate of increase in premarital sex, for both the
model and the data, occurs when the drop in the risk of pregnancy is most precipitous (i.e., after
1960). Premarital sex rises faster in the data than in the model, however. This could be due to
missing factors, such as the legalization of abortion, introduced in the next section. Still, it is
surprising how far the analysis can go without such considerations.
9.3. Abortion. In 1973 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that criminalized
abortion except when the life of the mother was in jeopardy. The ruling effectively provided
free access to abortion in the United States. The number of abortions immediately rose, as the
right-handpanelofFigure4illustrates.About56%ofpregnancieswereterminatedin1979.One
of the effects of the legalization of abortion was undoubtedly to reduce the cost of premarital
sex.
The effects of the liberalization of abortion laws will now be incorporated into the analysis.
To this end, let ψa represent the cost of an abortion and ψb denote the cost of an out-of-wedlock
birth. The odds of becoming pregnant for a girl engaging in premarital sex are represented by π.
Some fraction ξ of these girls will terminate their pregnancies, while the fraction 1 − ξ will bear
17 Some economic factors that underlie the S-shaped diffusion patterns associated with the adoption of new tech-
nologies are studied in Andolfatto and MacDonald (1998), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Manuelli and Seshadri
(2004), and Mukoyama (2006).912 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
the child. Given this notation, the expected cost of premarital sex, c, can therefore be written as
c = ψaξπ + ψb(1 − ξ)π.
Without loss of generality, normalize ψb = 1.
The parameter ψa will be picked so that the model does the best possible job in explaining
the trend toward premarital sex. The numbers ξ and π are taken from the data. The probability
of becoming pregnant, π, is given by the failure rates calculated above. The time series for the
fraction of pregnancies terminated in an abortion, ξ, is presented in Figure 4 (right-hand panel).
The empirical procedure picks ψa = 0.0853, so an abortion is much less costly than an out-of-
wedlockbirth.Figure3(left-handpanel),showstheﬁt.Theprocedurenowpicks j = 0.1278and
ςj = 0.0972. As can be seen, the model does much better once abortion is allowed for. Observe
that the risk associated with premarital sex declines rapidly after 1973 due to the legalization of
abortion.Asaconsequence,thenumberofyoungfemalesexperiencingpremaritalsexincreases
more rapidly than in the baseline model. As the number of abortions declines after its peak in
1980, the trend toward premarital sex is dampened vis ` a vis the baseline model. In particular,
note the downward dip in sexual activity that occurs in the model as the risk of sex rises in the
mid-1980s—in contrast, the baseline model displays a monotonic rise.18
Finally, between 1900 and 1970 the number of teenage girls who had experienced premarital
sex rose from 6 to 51%. The 1973 Roe v. Wade decision cannot explain any of this rise. The
model (ﬁtted with abortion) predicts that 34% of girls would have engaged in premarital sex in
1970. In 1990 about 72% of 19-year-old girls had experienced premarital sex. The model ﬁtted
with abortion can be used to make a prediction about this. It forecasts that 66% of teenage
girls would have had premarital sex when abortion is freely available, versus 51% when it is not
(ξ = 0). Therefore, abortion explains roughly 23% of the predicted value of premarital sex for
1990, or 25% of the predicted rise.
9.3.1. Pregnancies. The model generates a prediction on how many teenage girls will get
pregnant each period. Figure 4 (left-hand panel) shows the percentage of girls who become
pregnant, both in the data and the model. The total number of pregnancies in the data is
calculated as the sum of births, abortions, and miscarriages for unmarried females between ages
15 and 19—the exact details are provided in the Appendix. Pregnancies for the model economy
are calculated as follows: Let mt denote the fraction of females who are having sex in period t
and let πt be the quarterly risk of pregnancy associated with premarital sex. Assume that if a girl
is pregnant in a given period, she cannot get pregnant again (whether or not the pregnancy was
terminated through an abortion) during the following two model periods (six months). These
girls can still have sex as long as they are matched, but are not counted as a part of the risk pool
for the pregnancy calculations. Then, an adjusted value, ma
t , for the fraction of women having
sex at time t who are at risk for pregnancy can be calculated as
ma
t = mt − mt−1πt−1(1 − δ) − mt−2πt−2(1 − δ)(1 − δ) − mt−2πt−2δµ.
The yearly pregnancy numbers in Figure 4 are constructed simply as ma
t [(1 − (1 − πt)4]. The
model performs well in generating the right level of pregnancies. In particular, it predicts a rise
and decline in the number of pregnancies, the same pattern that is observed in the data.
18 The cost structure can be further modiﬁed to include the cost associated with HIV/AIDS
c = ψaξπ + ψb(1 − ξ)π + ψhη,
where ψh is the cost of contracting HIV and η is the probability of contracting HIV in a sexual relationship. This
extension did not signiﬁcantly improve the model’s performance.SOCIAL CHANGE 913
FIGURE 5
THE POWER OF THE PILL
9.3.2. ThePowerofthePill. Theriseinpremaritalsexisoftenassociatedwiththeinvention
of the birth control pill. The model can be used to assess this claim. In particular, one can run
the counterfactual experiment where no pill is invented. The ﬁrst step in the experiment is to
calculate the risk of premarital sex without the pill. This is easy to do using the information
provided in Tables 1 and 2. Speciﬁcally, allocate birth control pill users across the other methods
of contraception, including withdrawal, according to their frequency of use. After having done
this, construct a new series for the risk of pregnancy in the same manner as before. Rerun the
simulations using this new series.19 The upshot of the experiment is shown in Figure 5. As can
be seen, the invention of the birth control pill contributed very little to the rise in premarital sex
amongteenagers.Forexample,in2002itaccountedfor1percentagepointoutofthe75%ofgirls
who had experienced sex by age 19. The reason is simple. The pill is not used by a large number
ofteenagegirls,andoncethisnumberisallocatedtoothermethodstheoveralleffectsaresmall.
Thus, its introduction did not affect the risk of pregnancy much. A similar experiment can be
conducted for condoms, with pretty much the same result. Thus, no particular contraceptive is
responsible for the sexual revolution, since there were readily available reasonable alternatives.
9.3.3. Cross-sectionalImplicationsontheNumberofPartners. Relationshipsaregoverned
inthemodel’ssteadystatebyaMarkovchainstructure.Recallthattheprobabilityofameeting,
µ, and the odds of a breakup, δ, are chosen so that the Markov chain (17) generates the fraction
of teenage life spent in a relationship and the median duration for one that are observed in
the U.S. data. The Markov chain matching technology also yields predictions on the number of
partners that a promiscuous person will have between the ages of 15 and 19, or across 20 model
periods.
In order to calculate the total number of partners per promiscuous agent over 20 model
periods, let mi
t denote the number of matched agents with i sexual encounters by time t and
19 Keep j = 0.1278 and ςj = 0.0972.914 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
TABLE 3
NUMBER OF PARTNERS
(Active females by age 19, fraction)
No. of partners 1 2–34 –67 +
Data 0.390 0.306 0.171 0.133
Markov chain 0.1343 0.7205 0.1451 0.0001
ui
t represent the number of unmatched agents with i sexual encounters. Then, the number of
matched individuals with i sexual encounters in period t + 1 is given by
mi
t+1 = (1 − δ)mi
t + µui−1
t . (18)
In this equation, the fraction (1 − δ) of matched promiscuous people with i lifetime partners
in period t will remain in their current relationship next period so that these individuals will
still have i partners then, whereas the proportion µ of single agents with i − 1 partners will ﬁnd
matches and thus have i partners next period. In similar fashion,
ui
t+1 = (1 − µ)ui
t + δmi
t. (19)
An upper bound on the maximum number of partners after T periods of matching is N =
T/2 + 1. Thus, Equations (18) and (19) deﬁne a Markov chain over {m0
t ,u0
t ,...,mN
t ,uN
t }. This
MarkovchaincanbesimulatedforT periodsstartingfromtheinitialdistribution{0,1,...,0,0}.
ItcanbeusedtocalculatethemeannumberoftotalpartnersperindividualoverT periods—see
Greenwood and Guner (2009b) for more detail.20
In2002,asexuallyactiveteenagegirlhad3.0partnersbyage19.TheMarkovchain’sprediction
is 2.5. Although the means are close, the data exhibit far more cross-sectional variation than
the Markov chain does, as Table 3 shows. As can be seen, in the data far more girls have just
one partner than predicted by the Markov chain for matching. At the same time, a much larger
number of girls have more than seven partners in the data than is forecasted by the Markov
chain.
How to model such variety in sexual experience is an interesting issue. One might think
that modeling unfaithfulness (that is simultaneous relationships by a person) is important here.
The fraction of teenagers with multiple partners, however, seems to be quite low. Abma and
Sonenstein (2001), using the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), report that only
17.5% of teenage girls and 12.8% of teenage boys had more than one partner in the last three
months. But, some of these would just be a change in partners. Hence, the fraction of teenagers
with multiple simultaneous partners within a three-month period must be even smaller. In a
similar vein, Sonenstein et al. (1991, p. 164) also report that “(v)ery few of the sexually active
respondents in the NSAM appear to have been involved in simultaneous sexual relationships.
Seventy-nine percent of sexually active young men reported having had no multiple sexual
relationships in any of the last 12 months.” They also report that between the 1979 and 1988
waves of NSAM, the number of partners declined whereas the level of sexual activity was
increasing. Their analysis uses a different data set, the National Survey of Adolescent Males
(NSAM). Finally, in an extensive report on teenage sexual behavior, the Alan Guttmacher
Institute (1994, p. 24) reports that “(b)ecause of concerns about STDs, especially HIV, health
20 Note that the model’s steady-state Markov chain structure is slightly different from the Markov chain, given by
(18) and (19), that is ﬁt to the U.S. data. In the real world teenage life lasts a ﬁxed number of years, here taken to be the
ﬁve years between 15 and 19, inclusive. In the model they exit teenage life each period with probability 1 − ζ. Recall
that ζ is set so that teenage life expectancy is ﬁve years. This does not lead to signiﬁcant difference in the two Markov
chains’ predictions on the number of partners.SOCIAL CHANGE 915
ofﬁcials and medical professionals advise sexually active individuals to have only one partner—
that is, to be in a mutually monogamous relationship. Unmarried people, young and old alike,
often translate this advise into ‘serial monogamy’.”
Howcanmoredispersioninpartnersbeobtained?Cuttingtheperiodlengthcanhelp,because
the length of a period limits the number of partners one can have during one’s teenage years.
Indeed, some limited experimentation shows that cutting period length from a quarter to a
month allows the model to match the dispersion in the data better.21 It is still hard to get a
substantial number of girls with a large number of partners (7+), though. One way of doing this
may be to allow for heterogeneity in types. That is, perhaps one could let a small number of
individuals have higher values for µ and δ than others. This could proxy for the fact that some
people like variety in mates. This is the type of extension that the next generation of models
may be able to entertain.
10. CONCLUSIONS
What causes social change? The idea here is that a large part of social change is a reaction
to technological progress in the economy. Technological progress affects society’s consumption
and production possibilities. It therefore changes individuals’ incentives to abide by social cus-
toms and mores. As people gradually change their behavior to take advantage of emerging
opportunities, custom (an aggregation of individual behavior) slowly evolves too.
This notion is applied here to the rocket-like rise in premarital sex that occurred over the last
century. Now, a majority of youth engage in premarital sex. One hundred years ago almost none
did. This is traced here to the dramatic decline in the expected cost of premarital sex, due to
technological improvement in contraceptives and their increased availability. This is modeled
within the context of an equilibrium matching model. The model has two key ingredients. First,
individuals weigh the cost and beneﬁt of coitus when engaging in premarital sexual activity.
Second, they associate with individuals who share their own proclivities. Such a model mimics
well the observed rise in premarital sexual activity, given the observed decline in the risk of sex.
Improvementincontraceptivetechnologymayalsopartiallyexplainthedeclineinthefraction
of life spent married for a female from 0.88 in 1950 to 0.60 in 1995.22 This is due to delays in ﬁrst
marriages and remarriages and a rise in divorce. Historically, the institution of marriage was a
mechanism to have safe sex, among other things. As sex became safer, the need for marriage
declined on this account. According to Becker (1991, p. 326):
Since the best way to learn about someone else is by being together, intensive search is more effective
when unwed couples spend considerable time together, perhaps including trial marriages. Yet when
contraceptives are crude and unreliable, trial marriages and other premarital contact greatly raise the
risk of pregnancy. The signiﬁcant increase during this century in the frequency of trial marriages and
other premarital contact has been in part a rational response to major improvements in contraceptive
techniques,andisnotdecisiveevidencethatyoungpeoplenowvaluesexualexperiencesmorethanthey
did in the past.
An interesting avenue for future research might be to investigate the implications of the
contraceptive revolution for marriage and divorce.23,24
21 With a shorter period length the model does a better job in predicting the ﬁrst three cells of Table 3. In particular,
thenumberofgirlswithjustonepartnernowlooksmuchbetter.Asperiodlengthshrinksthemodelbecomesmuchmore
computationally demanding, both in terms of memory and speed. Additionally, calibrating the model and matching it
up with the data is now more of a concern. In particular, one must think carefully about how to map the high frequency
observations from the model with the low frequency observations from the U.S. data. For example, a smaller number of
teenagers will have sex in a month than in a quarter, and fewer will have sex in quarter than in a year. So, issues about
time aggregation for the model and in the U.S. data are important.
22 This fact is taken from Greenwood and Guner (2009a) and is analyzed from a different perspective there.
23 Interestingly, Choo and Siow (2006) estimate, using an nontransferable utility model of the U.S. marriage market,
that the gains for marriage accruing to young adults fell sharply between 1971 and 1981.
24 The introduction of infant formula is another example of a small invention having a large impact on household
activity. Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) argue that this promoted labor-force participation by married women (in addition
to advances in pediatric and obstetric medicine). It could also impact on marriage and divorce.916 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
APPENDIX
A. Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Conjecture a solution for the decision rules and value functions in
steady state. Speciﬁcally, assume that
(i) 1a(j, ˜ j) = 2a,s(j, ˜ j) = 1
a,p
s (j) = 1 and 1p(j, ˜ j) = 0 for all j, ˜ j ∈ A,
(ii) 1a(j, ˜ j) = 1
a,p
s (j) = 0 and 1p(j, ˜ j) = 2p,s(j, ˜ j) = 1 for all j, ˜ j ∈ P,
(iii) A m(j, ˜ j) = A m∗(j), where A m∗(j) is a function, for all j, ˜ j ∈ A,
(iv) Pm(j, ˜ j) = Pm∗(j), where Pm∗(j) is a function, for all j, ˜ j ∈ P.
This conjectured solution will now be veriﬁed.
To begin with, establish that there is no incentive for a matched couple in A to switch to P
or vice versa. To this end, subtract (1) from (3) to obtain Pm(j, ˜ j) − A m(j, ˜ j) = j − c. Clearly,
Pm(j, ˜ j) − A m(j, ˜ j)  0a sj  c. Thus, there is no gain for a matched couple (j, ˜ j) ∈ P or
another one (j, ˜ j) ∈ A to switch from their respective social classes.
Now, (i) and (ii) imply that am(j, ˜ j) = 1 and pm(j, ˜ j) = 0 for (j, ˜ j) ∈ A, and am(j, ˜ j) = 0 and
pm(j, ˜ j) = 1 for (j, ˜ j) ∈ P. Given (i), (ii), and (iii) when (j, ˜ j) ∈ A Equations (1) and (2) can be
represented by
A m∗(j) = u + β(1 − δ)A m∗(j) + βδA s(j),
and
A s∗(j) = w + βµA m∗(j) + β(1 − µ)A s(j).
Clearly, when (j, ˜ j) ∈ A then A m(j, ˜ j) is no longer a function of ˜ j. This occurs because ˜ j will
always desire to remain matched with j and vice versa. Direct calculation reveals that
A m∗(j) =
[1 − β(1 − µ)]u + βδw
 
, (A.1)
and
A s∗(j) =
[1 − β(1 − δ)]w + βµu
 
, (A.2)
where  ≡ (1 − β)[1 − β(1 − µ − δ)] > 0.Thus,point(iii)hasbeenshown.Forfuturereference,
letanasteriskattachedtoafunctionsignifyitsclosed-formsolutioninasteadystate,deﬁnedonly
over the equilibrium set of agents that live in the relevant social class. Observe that A m∗(j) >
A s∗(j), as was conjectured, because u >w .
Likewise, for (j, ˜ j) ∈ P note that Equations (3) and (4) can then be rewritten as
Pm∗(j) = u + j − c + β(1 − δ)Pm∗(j) + βδPs(j),
and
Ps(j) = w + βµPm∗(j) + β(1 − µ)Ps(j).
The solutions to these two equations are given by
Pm∗(j) =
(u + j − c)[1 − β(1 − µ)] + wβδ
 
, (A.3)SOCIAL CHANGE 917
and
Ps∗(j) =
[1 − β(1 − δ)]w + βµ(u + j − c)
 
. (A.4)
It is easy to see that
Pm∗(j) − Ps∗(j) =
(u + j − c − w)(1 − β)
 
.
Thus, Pm∗(j) > Ps∗(j) when u + j − c >w , which will hold for all j > c. Therefore, point (iv)
has been established.
Conditions (i) to (iv) imply that Ps(j) < A s(j) for j ∈ A and Ps(j) > A s(j) for j ∈ P. First,
note that in the conjectured steady state as
i = 0 for all i > b and ps
i = 0 for all i < b. Using this
observation, subtract (2) from (4) in steady state to get
Ps(j) − A s(j) = βµ
n  
i=b+1
ps
i [am(j, ˜ ji)A m(j, ˜ ji) + pm(j, ˜ ji)Pm(j, ˜ ji)]
− βµ
b  
i=1
as
i [am(j, ˜ ji)A m(j, ˜ ji) + pm(j, ˜ ji)Pm(j, ˜ ji)]
+ β{(1 − µ) + µ
n  
i=b+1
ps
i [1 − am(j, ˜ ji) − pm(j, ˜ ji)]}
×
 
1a,p
s (j)A s(j) +
 
1 − 1a,p
s (j)
 
Ps(j)
 
− β{(1 − µ) + µ
b  
i=1
as
i [1 − am(j, ˜ ji) − pm(j, ˜ ji)]}
×
 
1a,p
s (j)A s(j) +
 
1 − 1a,p
s (j)
 
Ps(j)
 
.
For j ∈ P (which implies j > c) it is easy to see that
Ps(j) − A s(j) = βµ
n  
i=b+1
ps
i Pm(j, ˜ ji) − βµ
b  
i=1
as
i [am(j, ˜ ji)A m(j, ˜ ji) + pm(j, ˜ ji)Pm(j, ˜ ji)]
+ β(1 − µ)Ps(j) − β{(1 − µ) + µ
b  
i=1
as
i [1 − am(j, ˜ ji) − pm(j, ˜ ji)]}Ps(j)
>β µ Pm∗(j) − βµ
b  
i=1
as
i [am(j, ˜ ji) + pm(j, ˜ ji)]Pm(j, ˜ ji)
− βµ
b  
i=1
as
i [1 − am(j, ˜ ji) − pm(j, ˜ ji)]Pm(j, ˜ ji)
= βµPm∗(j) − βµ
b  
i=1
as
i Pm(j, ˜ ji) > 0.
The ﬁrstinequalityreliesonthefactsthat Pm(j, ˜ ji) > A m(j, ˜ ji)and Pm(j, ˜ ji) > Ps(j)for j ∈P.
The latter fact is intuitive. Surely, a promiscuous type would prefer to have sex now and search
for another partner later as opposed to searching now and having sex later. It is straightforward
to establish. The last inequality employs the fact that Pm∗(j) > Pm(j, ˜ ji) for ˜ ji ∈ A. Again this
is appealing. A promiscuous type should prefer a partner whose type also lies in P. This, too, is918 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
not difﬁcult to prove. Thus, no unmatched j ∈ P would want to switch. A similar argument can
be made for j ∈ A.
It is easy to deduce that the above facts established about the value functions support the
conjectured decision rules in (i) and (ii). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. The proof proceeds using the guess-and-verify strategy. To this end,
suppose that the value functions A m(j, ˜ j), A s(j), Pm(j, ˜ j), and Ps(j) immediately jump to their
new steady-state values upon the once-and-all decline in c. Now, consider a pair in the situation
described by Point 1 in Section 6.1. The relevant payoffs for j when matched with ˜ j, for j, ˜ j
∈{jd+1,...,jn}, will be given by (A.3) and (A.4). Note that when this match breaks up person
j will not have to worry about subsequently matching in P with a ˜ j ∈{j1,...,jd}, given Point
2. Thus, from their own limited perspective, these agents will be immediately jumping into the
new steady state since they will never have to mix with a type in the set {j1,...,jd}. Next, focus
upon those individuals in the situation outlined by Point 2. Their payoffs will again be described
by (A.3) and (A.4). Again, if they switch to P they will not have to worry about matching next
period with a ˜ j ∈{j1,...,jd}. So, from their viewpoint, these agents will be immediately moving
into the new steady-state situation in P. (The optimality of the steady state from an individual’s
perspective is detailed in the proof of Lemma 1.)
Now, move to Point 3. Let j ∈{j1,...,jd} and ˜ j ∈{jd+1,...,jb}. For it to be optimal for j to
be matched with ˜ j in this situation in A it must transpire that A m(j, ˜ j) > max{A s(j), Ps(j)} and
Pm(j, ˜ j) < max{A m(j, ˜ j), A s(j), Ps(j)}. First, by subtracting (1) from (3) it can be seen that
Pm(j, ˜ j) − A m(j, ˜ j) = j − c  0a sj  c. Therefore, j’s ﬁrst choice is a match in A, whereas
˜ j’s would be one in P. Now, there are two cases to consider for j. Either she is in a mixing
situation with ˜ j [implying 2p,s(j, ˜ j) = 1] or she is refusing a promiscuous match all together
[2p,s(j, ˜ j) = 0]. Take the latter situation ﬁrst. The conjecture is that today’s value functions
will immediately jump to their steady-state values and remain there. This would imply that
1
a,p
s (j, ˜ j) = 1,am(j, ˜ j) = 1,pm(j, ˜ j) = 0. Using this on the right-hand sides of (1) and (2) and
solving for A m(j, ˜ j) and A s(j) results in
A m(j, ˜ j) = A m∗(j), [for j ≤ jd < jd+1 ≤ ˜ j and am(j, ˜ j) = 1]
and
A s(j) = A s∗(j), (for j ≤ jd),
where A m∗(j) and A s∗(j) are speciﬁed by (A.1) and (A.2). Imposing this conjecture on (4) leads
to
Ps(j) = w + βµ
n  
k=d+1
ps
k[am(j, ˜ jk)A m(j, ˜ jk) + pm(j, ˜ jk)Pm(j, ˜ jk)] + β(1 − µ)A s∗(j)
< A s∗(j) < A m∗(j) (for j ≤ jd < jd+1 ≤ ˜ j).
Thus, j will remain happy with her lot in A, so there is no need to change her strategy today,
taking as given ˜ j’s strategy.
Next, consider the mixing situation for j. Here, the solution for A m(j, ˜ j) reads
A m(j, ˜ j) =
u + β(1 − δ)(j − c)/2 + βδA s∗(j)
1 − β(1 − δ)
< A m∗(j) [for j ≤ jd < ˜ j and am(j, ˜ j) = 1/2].
For jtoagreetoamixingsituationitmusttranspirethat A m(j, ˜ j) > A s∗(j).Observethat A m(j, ˜ j)
is increasing in j. Thus, mixing cannot occur for any j ≤ jp where p = argmax
i
{i : A m(ji, ˜ j) <
A s∗(ji)}. When j > jp, there will be no incentive for j to switch strategies.SOCIAL CHANGE 919
Now, move to person ˜ j.F o r ˜ j to be matched with j it must happen that A m( ˜ j, j) >
max{A s( ˜ j), Ps( ˜ j)}. Person ˜ j may ﬁnd himself in one of two situations: either a mixing situ-
ation or one where j will refuse a promiscuous match. In the former 2p,s(j, ˜ j) = 1, whereas in
the latter 2p,s(j, ˜ j) = 0. Take the latter case and suppose that the steady-state solution holds
true at some point in time. Here, am(j, ˜ j) = 1 and pm(j, ˜ j) = 0. It is then easy to deduce that
A m( ˜ j, j) and A s( ˜ j) are given by
A m( ˜ j, j) = u + β(1 − δ)A m( ˜ j, j) + βδPs∗( ˜ j)
=
u + βδPs∗( ˜ j)
1 − β(1 − δ)
< pm∗( ˜ j) [for j ≤ jd < jd+1 ≤ ˜ j and am(j, ˜ j) = 1],
and
A s( ˜ j) = w + βµ
d  
h=1
as
h[am( ˜ j, jh)A m( ˜ j, jh) + pm( ˜ j, jh)pm( ˜ j, jh)]
+ β(1 − µ)Ps∗( ˜ j)
< Ps∗( ˜ j) < Pm∗( ˜ j) (for jd+1 ≤ ˜ j).
Now, an abstinent match cannot occur for any ˜ j > jq where q = argmax
i
{i : A m( ˜ ji, j) >
Ps∗( ˜ ji)}. When ˜ j ≤ jq is true, there is no incentive for ˜ j to shift from the conjectured strat-
egy. Similarly, it is straightforward to calculate that when there is mixing
A m( ˜ j, j) =
u + β(1 − δ)( ˜ j − c)/2 + βδPs∗( ˜ j)
1 − β(1 − δ)
< Pm∗( ˜ j)
[for j ≤ jd < jd+1 ≤ ˜ j and am(j, ˜ j) = 1/2].
As can be seen, mixing will yield ˜ j a higher level of utility than a purely abstinent match when
˜ j > c.Mixingcannotoccurforany ˜ j > jr wherer = argmax
i
{i : A m( ˜ ji, j) > Ps∗( ˜ ji)}.Individual
˜ j will have no incentive to deviate from the conjectured strategy when ˜ j ≤ jr.
The situations described in Points 4 and 5 can be similarly analyzed. The reader is spared the
details. 
B.2. Data Sources
 Figure 1
– Left-hand panel, premarital sex: For 1900, 1924, and 1934, the numbers are computed
from Kinsey et al. (1953, table 83, p. 339); for 1958, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1976, 1979, and
1982, the data is derived from Hoffreth et al. (1987, tables 2 and 3, pp. 48–9); for
1988 and 1995, see Abma and Sonenstein (2001, table 1, p. 28); for 2002, the fraction
of 19-year-old females with premarital sexual experience was obtained via private
correspondence with Joyce Abma (Division of Vital Statistics, National Center for
Health Statistics). The data for 1900, 1924, and 1934 are for white females.
– Left-hand panel, out-of-wedlock births: For 1920 and 1930, see Cutright (1972, table
1, p. 383), and for the data between 1940 and 1999, see Ventura and Bachrach (2000).
– Right-hand panel, number of partners: Laudmann et al. (1994, table 5.5, p. 198).
 Table1,contraceptionuseatﬁrstpremaritalintercourse:For1900,seeHimes(1963,table
V,p.345);fortheyears1960–64,seeMosherandBachrach(1987,table2,p.87);for1965–
88, the numbers are taken from Mosher and McNally (1991, table 1, p. 110); for 1985–95,
thedataarecontainedinAbmaetal.(1997,table39,p.49);for1990–2002,thenumbersare
takenMosheretal.(2004,table3,p.16).ThesepapersusedifferentwavesoftheNational920 GREENWOOD AND GUNER
Survey of Family Growth (NSFG). The multiple users were not reported until the 1995
NSFG.InMosheretal.(2004),thepercentageofusersforeachmethodcountstheusersof
multiple methods. Thus, the sum across different methods is more than the total fraction
who use any method. In Table 1, the percentage distribution across different methods is
normalized to sum up to the total fraction who use any method. The “other” methods
category includes the use of diaphragms, cervical caps, IUDs, vaginal spermicides (such
as foams, jellies, creams, and sponges), the rhythm method, and injections and implants,
which were introduced in 1990s.
 Table 2, failure rates for condoms, the pill, withdrawal, and other methods: For all con-
traceptives, failure rates are measured in terms of the percentage of women who become
pregnant during the ﬁrst year of use. First, for the period prior to 1960, see the discussion
in Section 7. Second, for the period 1960–2002 the sources are more varied. Hatcher
et al. (1976, 1980) report a 15–20% failure rate of condoms for typical users. Given the
10–20% failure rates given by Tietze (1970), it is safe to set a 17.5% failure rate in Table
2 for the 1960–82 period. Hatcher et al. (1984, 1988) present 10% and 12% failure rates,
respectively. Accordingly, an average value of 11% is selected for the 1983–89 period.
Finally, Hatcher et al. (1998 and 2004) list 14% and 15% failure rates. For the 1990–2002
period the average value of 14.5% is used. Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980) give 5–10% and
10% failure rates for the typical use of the pill. Therefore, set the failure rate at 7.5% for
the1960–82period.Hatcheretal.(1984,1988)presentmuchlowerfailureratesof2%and
4.7%. Accordingly, set the effectiveness for the 1983–89 period to the average value of
3.35%.Finally,forthe1990–2002periodaveragethe3%failureratereportedbyHatcher
et al. (1998) and Kelly (2001) and the 8% failure rate given by Hatcher et al. (2004). The
numbers for withdrawal are again based on the estimates of Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980)
who give 20–25% failure rates. The numbers for 1983–95 are based on Hatcher et al.
(1984, 1989), who report 23% and 18% failure rates, whereas those for the 1995–2002
period derive from Hatcher et al. (1998, 2004) who present 19% and 27% failure rates.
Finally, given the small number of people using other methods the results are not very
sensitive to the assumption made regarding their effectiveness. A simple assumption is
made here that the failure rate for all other methods between 1960 and 1988 was about
20%, and then declined to 10%. According to Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,
1998, and 2004) the failure rate of the IUD was about 6–10% in 1976, declined to about
5% in the 1980s, and ﬁnally reached 3% by 2004. The failure rate for the diaphragm was
about 20–25% in 1976 and remained pretty much constant until recently. It had a 16%
failure rate in 2004. The same is also true for many vaginal spermicides (foams, jellies,
sponges, etc.) that had about 20–30% failure rates during this entire period. Injections
and implants, two very effective contraceptives, were introduced in the 1990s—see FDA
(1997).
 Figure 4
– Left-handpanel,teenagepregnancies:Henshaw(2004,table1,p.1)reportsthenumber
of births, abortions, and miscarriages (the latter calculated as 20% of births plus 10%
of abortions) for all teenage, 15–19-year-old girls for the 1972–2000 period. In order to
calculate the number of pregnancies for unmarried teenage girls, the numbers of births
and abortions for unmarried teenagers are needed. Births are obtained from Ventura
et al. (2001, table 1, p. 10). The number of abortions, however, is only available for all
teenagers, and just for the post-1972 period. Hence, certain assumptions are made to
generate a pregnancy series for unmarried teenagers. The series reported in the article
is based on a simple calculation. For the 1972–2000 period it sums births to unmarried
teenagers,allabortionstoteenagers,andmiscarriages(calculatedas20%ofbirthsplus
10% of abortions). For the 1960–71 period it estimates the total number of pregnancies
by simply assuming that the (abortions + miscarriages)/(out-of-wedlock births) ratio
took the same value as it did in 1972.SOCIAL CHANGE 921
– Right-hand panel, abortion: The sources for the abortion numbers presented in this
ﬁgure are discussed in the data sources for left-hand panel. The ratio of abortions to
pregnancies is calculated as the total number of abortions as reported by Henshaw
(2004) divided by the total number of pregnancies.
 Table 3, number of partners: The source is Abma et al. (2004, table 13, p. 26). When
calculating the mean number of partners from this data a value of 8 is assigned for the
7+ category.
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The following corrects some errors in the article:
1. Pg. 893, footnote 1, last sentence: ￿Phone: +34-93-581-3068. Fax:
+34-93-581-2102.￿
2. Pg. 897, last sentence before Section 3.1: ￿An example of this is shown
in Figure 2, which is detailed in Section 9.1￿ in this ￿gure both parties
prefer some sort of relationship to none at all.￿
3. Pg. 897, footnote 5, last two sentences: ￿A teen￿ s e⁄ective discount
factor would be ￿ = b ￿￿, where b ￿ is his subjective discount factor. To
get the equilibrium discussed in the text just set b ￿ = ￿=￿.￿
4. Pg. 919, lines 8 and 16: Should be ￿P m￿(e j)￿and not ￿pm￿(e j)￿in two
three places that the latter variable occurs.
5. Pg. 919, line 10: Should be ￿P m￿(e j;jh)￿and not ￿pm￿(e j;jh)￿ .
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